I. Introduction
The world of international law saw the establishment of a variety of new types of entities during the last decade of the twentieth century. One such entity is the World Bank 1 Inspection Panel which has the competence to investigate complaints brought by private parties in borrowing countries alleging that the World Bank has failed to follow its own policies and procedures when designing, appraising and/or implementing Bank-financed projects. The Inspection Panel was created by the Bank's Executive Directors 2 on 22 September 1993 3 in an attempt to increase the World Bank's accountability vis-a-vis non-state actors, and to improve compliance with, inter alia, its social and environmental policies. 4 Since Panel operations began in September 1994, 5 the Inspection Panel has received 21 Requests for Inspection of Bank-financed projects in Nepal, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Brazil, Chile, Bangladesh, ArAs used in this article, the term "World Bank" or "Bank" covers both the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). There are 24 Executive Directors. Five Directors are appointed by members with the largest number of shares. These are France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other 19 are elected every two years by the Governors of the remaining members. Normally, the Executive Directors meet twice a week to oversee the Bank's business. gentina/Paraguay, India, Lesotho/South Africa, Nigeria, China, Kenya, and Ecuador. 6 Most requests concerned infrastructure and environmental and land reform projects, and two requests were on adjustment operations. 7 This article covers the period up to March 2001. It examines the general functioning of the Panel mechanism, the Panel's mandate, and its costs and benefits through a case study of the Quinghai component of the China: Western Poverty Reduction Project (China-Tibet). The Quinghai Project, which was challenged by a Request for Inspection in June 1999, was chosen for various reasons. First, it is one of the Bank's most controversial projects because of its serious social and environmental effects. The Request for Inspection regarding the Quinghai Project does not only deserve closer examination because of the attention it has attracted, but also because it was the first request that went through a full investigation process. Second, the Panel review of the Quinghai Project makes an interesting case study because of the outcome: In the end, China withdrew its loan application and announced that it would pay for the project itself. Finally, and most importantly, the Quinghai Project has not been the subject of significant academic analysis to date unlike earlier Inspection Panel cases. This is despite the fact that the Panel, in its Investigation Report, deals with fundamental questions concerning, inter alia, the interpretation and application of Bank policies and procedures, and the approach it has taken in this regard is worth examining more closely.
The following section summarizes the background to the Quinghai case. Part III describes the Inspection Panel mechanism, and discusses special issues and developments regarding the assessment of the eligibility of a Request for Inspection. It will also deal with the Panel's mandate and its legal nature in general. A succeeding section will address the limits of the Panel's mandate, particularly with regard to the interpretation, application, and enforcement of Bank policies and procedures. Part V considers the consequences of Inspection Panel Investi- The China: Western Poverty Reduction Project, which is the 6th World Bank-assisted poverty reduction program in China, 8 aims at reducing absolute poverty in remote and inaccessible villages of three Chinese provinces: the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Gansu and Quinghai, the latter being located in western China. 9 Only the Quinghai component of the Poverty Reduction Project (henceforth: Quinghai Project) was the subject of both a Request for Inspection and an investigation by the Inspection Panel. The Quinghai Project aims to alleviate poverty through the resettlement of 57.775 farmers who currently practice high-altitude rain-fed agriculture in the mountainous areas of five counties in Haidong Prefecture and one county in Xining City Prefecture (Move-out area). The farmers are to be resettled to the dryland area of the Haixi Tibetan and Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture in Dulan County (Move-in area), where the renovation of an existing eight meter dam, the construction of a new 40 meter dam and of two canals, 29 and 56 km, respectively, are planned to supply water to irrigate some 26.500 ha of land. 10 In late spring 1999, the World Bank Management, responding to harsh external criticism of the Quinghai Project by environmental activists, human rights advocates, Tibet Support Groups, and other civil society groups opposed to the Bank's involvement in the Quinghai the benefit of people in Quinghai, for the people who were being resettled, those who were staying, and those who live in and around the Move-in area. 17 It is important to note, however, that the Executive Directors "in an unusual move" 18 approved this loan and credit with the proviso "that no work be done and no funds be disbursed for the .. . 20 The investigation was undertaken between September 1999 and January 2000 and included a field visit to Beijing and Quinghai Province. 21 The Inspection Panel Investigation Report, which was presented to the Executive Directors on 28 April 2000, concluded that Bank Management had violated seven of ten safeguard policies, inter alia, Operational Directives regarding Environmental Assessment, Indigenous Peoples, and Involuntary Resettlement, as well as Operational Procedures concerning Pest Management and Investment Lending, and Bank Procedure 17.50 regarding Disclosure of Information. In a statement issued on 6 July 2000, the Chinese Government harshly criticized the Inspection Panel Report, putting, inter alia, forward, that " [t] he Panel [in the investigation of the Quinghai component] takes on the role of a critic of the Chinese government and the social and political system of China, rather than carry out a review of Bank staff and Management's compliance with Bank policies," and that it "is being used as an instrument to oppose China politically, acting as a proxy for those who are waging a campaign against the sovereignty and integrity of the country." 23 The World Bank Executive Directors, after an extensive debate on 6 July 2000, 24 failed to reach a decision on the Inspection Panel's recommendation and agreed to resume talks the following day. The choices the Directors faced were (a.) to go ahead with the project, (b.) to cancel it, or (c.) to carry out further environmental and social studies over the following 15 to 18 months before providing any funds. 25 On 7 July 2000, however, before the Executive Directors were able to reach a consensus, China withdrew its application for the US$ 40 million Quinghai loan on the grounds that new conditions were unacceptable as the loan conditions had already been agreed upon, and noted that it would pay for the project itself. 26 China's withdrawal lead to the Bank's departure from the Quinghai Project. The Bank's President, James Wolfensohn, favored the third choice. Cf. ibid.
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The Chinese Executive Director, Zhu Xian, read the following statement to the Executive Directors on behalf of his authorities: "China accepts no conditions beyond Management's original recommendations that had been agreed between Management and my authorities .... It is unacceptable to my authorities that other Bank shareholders would insist on imposing additional conditions on Management's recommendations -namely coming back to the Board for approval again for a project that was already approved last year. If that is the case, China will therefore turn to its own resources to implement the Quinghai Component of the project, and in its own way. ... We regret that because of political opposition from some shareholders the World Bank has lost a good opportunity to assist some of the poorest people in China, probably in the world." The World Bank Group, "China to Implement Resolution, see note 3, para. 3.
Panel Members, after their term of office expires, will be ineligible for employment with the World Bank Group. 37 And fourthly, Panelists may only be removed from office by a decision of the Executive Directors. 38 It must be emphasized from the outset, however, that unlike national or international courts of law, the Panel is not a truly independent body despite these safeguards for independence. The Panel's independence is primarily "counterbalanced by the fact that it only has advisory powers." 39 As will be explained later in this paper, the Panel has only the power to make a recommendation to the Executive Directors as to whether the matter of request should be investigated. 40 It can not start an investigation of the request without prior approval by the Executive Directors. 
The General Functioning of the Panel Mechanism
The inspection process is to be performed in two phases. In the first phase, the Panel determines the eligibility of the requesters and the registered 42 Bank Management has 21 working days to respond to the allegations of the Requesters, Resolution, see note 3, para. 18. Pursuant to para. 3 of the 1999 Clarifications, Management, in its initial response to the Request for Inspection, must provide evidence that "it has complied with the relevant Bank operational policies and procedures; or that there are serious failures attributable exclusively to its own actions or omissions in complying, but that it intends to comply with the relevant policies and procedures, or that the serious failures that may exist are exclusively attributable to the borrower or to other factors external to the Bank, or that the serious failures that may exist are attributable both to the Bank's non-compliance with the relevant operational policies and procedures and to the borrower or other external factors." As required by the Resolution, a Request for Inspection presupposes that the Requester has already taken actions to bring the issue to the attention of the Management. The -necessarily -written request must explain Management's response to such action. Cf 48 Based on both the Panel and the Management Report, they then make a final decision on how to respond to the investigation report. 49 The Executive Directors must inform the complainants about the Panel Report and subsequent actions taken by the Bank.
50
As the Complaint Process has been well described elsewhere, 51 only some aspects of the Panel's assessment of the eligibility of a complaint ("admissibility" stage) will be discussed in the following section.
a. Eligibility Criteria in General
The Resolution provides for certain eligibility criteria which, in any case, must be fulfilled to establish the Panel's competence or "jurisdiction." 52 Resolution, see note 3, paras. 12-14. 53 See note 28.
(3) The request asserts that its subject matter has been brought to Management's attention and that, in the requester's view, Management has failed to respond adequately by demonstrating that it has followed or is taking steps to follow the Bank's policies and procedures (Resolution para. 13). (4) The matter is not related to procurement (Resolution para. 14 (5) The related loan has not been closed or substantially disbursed (Resolution para. 14 lit.(c)). (6) The Panel has not previously made a recommendation on the subject matter or, if it has, the request asserts that there is new evidence or circumstances not known at the time of the prior request (Resolution para. 14 lit.(d)). Pursuant to para. 7 of the 1999 Clarifications, the Panel visits the project country if it believes that this is necessary to establish the eligibility of the request. Under the Resolution, the term "affected party ... which is not a single individual" covers "a community of persons such as an organization, association, society or other grouping of individuals" living in the project area, but not a single individual. 55 The Request for Inspection can either be submitted by the affected party itself or by a representative acting for and on behalf of the affected party. 56 Although the representative should, as a rule, be local, foreign representatives may be allowed to file a claim if appropriate representation is not locally available.
57
Complaints by external NGOs acting on their own are, however, not eligible.
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Although the question of "non-local" representation concerns the admissibility of the complaint, it is not the Panel which decides on whether the Requester's contention that appropriate local representation is not available is convincing, but the World Bank's Executive Di- 54 Ibid. 55 Resolution, see note 3, para. 12.
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Ibid.
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Ibid. 58 Cf. Shihata, 1994, see note 51, 58.
rectors. 59 The agreement on the requirement of the Executive Directors' approval of foreign representation as embodied in the Resolution was a compromise solution. The Executive Directors who, in August 1993, considered draft resolutions in a Committee of the Whole, 60 were split on the question whether an affected party may have a foreign representative, with some Executive Directors representing developed countries being in favour of such representation and other Executive Directors representing borrowing countries opposing it. 61 The Panel's legal architect, Ibrahim Shihata, remarked on this discussion:
"The issue was obviously of great importance to the concerned NGOs in developed countries which wanted to be in a position to represent affected parties in borrowing countries who, in the judgment of these NGOs, may not always be able to present their case against the Bank. It was also an important issue for some of the governments of borrowing countries which feared intervention of foreign parties in the relationship between these governments and their citizens and the increased politicization and internationalization of their domestic issues."
62
According to Shihata, the solution was "meant to assure those who feared abuse of this arrangement that the Board remained the final arbiter on whether the situation justified it." 63 Notwithstanding the reasons for the agreement on the current solution, the decision of the Executive Directors drafting the Resolution to have the politically motivated Executive Directors, who are, inter alia, responsible for policy decisions affecting the Bank's operations, 64 rather than the independent 59 Resolution, see note 3, para. 12. Cf. infra III. 3.b.
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As to the terminological differences between these two groups, see, e.g., the World Bank's definition of NGOs and civil society organisations. According to GP 14.70, "(t)he term 'NGO' refers to a myriad of different types of organizations. At its broadest, it includes all groupings of individuals that fall outside the public and non-profit sectors, whether legally constituted or informal, established or transient." In contrast, "civil society," is understood by the Bank to consist of "non-profit organizations and special interest groups, either formal or informal, working to improve the lives of their constituents. Civil society organizations (CSOs) include local parliamentarians, media, and policy development and research institutes. fected parties in the project area. 72 The most noteworthy request in this connection is, as already mentioned, the Request for Inspection regarding the Quinghai Project. Whereas in the preceding cases of representation, the requests were submitted by local representatives, in the Quinghai case, the inspection process was triggered by a U.S.-based NGO, the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), which acted for and on behalf of "Tibetan and Mongolian ethnic peoples" living in the project area. 73 (it) is acting as agent of the party on behalf of which the request is made.' Several Requesters living in the Project area have signed letters appointing the ICT to so act on their behalf. Based on this information, the Panel is satisfied that the ICT is acting on behalf of a group of people living in the Project area who feel that they may be seriously and adversely affected as a result of the design and execution of the Project." The ICT offered "evidence of why, in its judgment, the people in the Project area are not able to present their own case or use local representatives to do so. In light of the information received, the Panel believes that the Requesters genuinely feel that 'appropriate representation is not locally available'." Panel Report and Recommendation, see note 76, 6, paras. 23,25-26. 78 Cf. the participation of NGOs in the WTO dispute settlement process, in particular NGO participation in procedures of the Appellate Body through the submission of an amicus cttriae brief. Cf cedures, but also held an unprecedented meeting with NGOs to discuss the proposal. 86 Second, the Request for Inspection submitted by the International Campaign for Tibet is representative for the phenomenon of globalization and its implications for an international organization's work in a particular country: Whereas in the past, information disadvantageous to the organization's international reputation was concealed from the public, in the age of information technology, which is characterized by an increase in transborder communication and activity, such information can no longer be suppressed. In this respect, the fear of the opponents of foreign representation of affected parties, namely that "nonlocal" representation might lead to the intervention of foreign parties in the internal affairs of the borrowing countries as well as to the "increased politicization and internationalization of their domestic issues," 87 was not unfounded.
The third interesting aspect of the Quinghai Project case is the Executive Directors' authorization of an investigation without final determination of all eligibility criteria. This could favourably be interpreted as demonstrating the Directors' basic attitude of not preventing an investigation from being conducted because of mere formal, or rather procedural requirements. If this interpretation is correct, the Executive Directors' conduct would be a welcome development. It contrasts with their earlier practice of requiring the Panel to undertake an extensive preliminary investigation of each Request for Inspection to determine its eligibility. 88 It is hoped that the Inspection Panel will, in future cases, interpret the right of complainants to make use of "non-local" representatives, which can be regarded as being analogous to the granting of the right to counsel in legal proceedings, 89 as generously as it did with regard to the claim filed by the International Campaign for Tibet. Such an interpretation would, as has rightly been put forward by Bradlow in an article The result of such a preliminary investigation was often that the Bank's Management submitted a remedial action plan directly to the Executive Directors before the Directors had had an opportunity to decide whether to authorize a full investigation. 89 Cf. Bradlow, see note 34,63. Pursuant to the Resolution, the affected party must demonstrate "that its rights or interests have been or are likely to be directly affected" by the Bank's failure to follow its operational rules and procedures. 91 The function of this eligibility requirement is two-fold. First, it is meant to exclude requests which are based on an alleged public interest in which the requester has no personal stake. 92 In this respect, it is analogous to the exclusion of the so-called actio popularis, as known, for example, in administrative law claims. Second, its purpose is:
"to broaden the scope of coverage ... so as to include not only titles, powers, and privileges protected by law but also substantiated claims to such titles, powers, and privileges and the avoidance of harm (in the sense of bodily injury or financial loss) that otherwise may affect the requester. Alleged rights by an affected party have to be based on the law applicable in the territory where the alleged harm has taken place, including treaties incorporated in that law to the extent that they directly extend rights to private parties." Ibid. The Panel's procedures attempt to make private complaints as easy as possible. A Request for Inspection can be submitted any-time up to the closing date of the project, i.e. the date on which the last part of the Bank's loan is disbursed. Although English is the preferred language, the Request can be filed in any language either at the Bank's headquarters in Washington, D.C., or at any regional office. Finally, the complaint need not be in any special form, although using the sample form prepared by the Panel is recommended. Resolution, see note 3, para. 12.
92
Cf. Shihata, see note 3, 56 et seq.
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Ibid., 57.
not even mention this requirement. 94 The Panel's neglect of this requirement fits with its change of focus in the assessment. The Panel now places more emphasis on the alleged non-compliance by the Bank with its policies and procedures and less on harm suffered by the Requesters, as prescribed by the 1999 Clarifications. 95 It also highlights the fact that a complaint brought to the Inspection Panel is different from a complaint filed with a court of law as in the latter, the successful demonstration of an "affected right or interest" is a crucial requirement both for the admissibility and the merits of the case. This requirement is a corollary to the general outcome of a court procedure, which -unlike in a Panel investigation -is the redress of harm. For an analysis of the distinction between the three concepts "accountability," "legal liability," and "international responsibility," see S. SchlemmerSchulte, "The World Bank, its Operations, and its Inspection Panel," Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 3 (1999), 175 et seq., (180 et seq.). The discussion of accountability of large multilateral financial organizations which led to the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel, has been regarded as being the counterpart to the "current debate on legal restraints concerning the activities of international organizations," such as, in particular, the United Nations. 
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OPS has thus far worked to strengthen compliance monitoring by the Bank units responsible for safeguard and fiduciary policies. Cf. The World Bank Group, "What We Do: Policies," available at the Bank's website. 100 The detection of non compliance with a safeguard policy leads to the issuance of a prompt resolution by the Bank's regional team, and can result in sanctions. For a more detailed account on and analysis of the Quality [...] is to inquire and recommend." 102 In this regard, supervision of Bank compliance with its operational policies and procedures by the Inspection Panel differs from internal supervision "through direct lines of managerial authority and through involvement of different departments and units," such as the Legal Department or the Operations Evaluation Department in that the former "has an important role in authorizing project documents and certain types of decisions," 103 but, unlike the Inspection Panel, is not an investigating body, and the latter "is oriented toward lessons to be drawn from the experience, rather than strict accountability." In an explanatory memorandum of 3 January 1995, the Senior Vice President and (then-) General Counsel of the World Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, emphasized that the Inspection Panel is not a judicial body. 105 In light of the Panel's legal mandate as laid down in the Resolution, the Clarifications and the Panel's Operating Procedures, and the Panel's operations thus far, this position must be followed. As has already been pointed out, the Panel can be viewed as a "quasi-judicial supervisory body" 106 at best. According to Bradlow, quasi-judicial supervision as compared to judicial and non-judicial supervision 107 includes elements of both of the latter categories. "It usually involves a relatively independent body that reaches either binding or non-binding decisions by 102 applying law to facts." 108 According to this description, the Panel is still a rather weak quasi-judicial supervisory body "lying closer to the nonjudicial end of the supervisory spectrum than to the judicial end" 109 : The Panel's mandate is limited to (a.) recommending to the Executive Directors that the challenged project be formally investigated, and (b.) when such a recommendation had been approved by the Board and an investigation is conducted, to submit an Investigation Report including the Panel's findings and recommendations to the Board. Unlike the findings of a court of law, the Panel's findings and recommendations are, however, not binding on the parties.
IV. The Applicable Standards in the Inspection Panel Process, their Legal Effects and Proper Interpretation
The Panel's supervisory power is clearly defined in the Resolution pursuant to which the Inspection Panel can only investigate complaints that the Bank has failed to follow its own policies and procedures in its operational work.
110 Accordingly, the substantive standards against which the Panel reviews Bank performance, are internal rules only.
111
Unlike local or international courts, the Panel does not apply domestic or general international law.
112
One may well argue that it would be desirable for the Panel to review a Bank project not only against internal but also against international law standards. In other words, "such standards might properly be invoked as part of the corpus of norms and practice that may guide 108 Bank, Barber Conable, 119 the objective of the review was "to conduct an assessment of the implementation of the ongoing Sardar Sarovar projects as regards (a.) the resettlement and rehabilitation of the population displaced/affected ... and (b.) the amelioration of the environmental impact of all aspects of the project, with reference to "existing Bank operational directives and guidelines." 120 In their Report, Morse and Berger departed from the Terms of Reference and did not simply assess compliance with the Bank's own policies and with the terms of loan agreements and other project documents, but applied Bank policies "in the context of wider public international law standards to which they relate." 121 In considering impacts on tribal peoples, for example, the report referred to standards prescribed in ILO Convention No. 107, and advocated evaluation of Bank policies by reference to relevant standards of general international law.
122 As desirable as the broad approach taken by Morse and Berger might be, it must be borne in mind that the Inspection Panel neither is nor was intended to be an international court, but that it was set up as an internal inspection mechanism to achieve accountability and transparency in Bank operations. However, the current status of the Panel does not preclude it from gradually developing into a true international judicial body.
In the following sections, the substantive standards against which the Inspection Panel reviews Bank performance, the legal effects of those standards, and their interpretation by the Panel will be examined.
The Substantive Standards against which a Bank Project is Reviewed by the Panel
Thus far, the Inspection Panel has not followed the approach recommended by the Morse-Berger Report, but has operated strictly within its formal mandate as regards the applicable set of rules. The standards to be and having been invoked by the Panel in the investigation process, that are operational policies and procedures, are defined in the Resolu- 131 Most of these policies, many of which have been in place for almost ten years, were developed in response to world-wide criticism, primarily by NGOs and some donor governments, that Bank projects often irreversibly harm the environment, displace people and negatively affect their livelihoods. 132 The policies undoubtedly have the potential to mitigate damage which might be and often has been caused by economic development as promoted by the Bank. They are necessary for the Bank to bridge the traditional contradiction between environmental sustainability and social protection on the one hand and economic development on the other, even if this means that they increase the costs of projects. The Panel's record shows that the project requirements prescribed in the "safeguard policies" are of supreme concern to project-affected groups that might have previously been neglected. 
Interpretation, Application and Enforcement of Bank Policies and Procedures
Throughout its work, the Inspection Panel has been faced with the serious problem that there is still no consensus among the World Bank staff as to how the Bank's operational policies and procedures should be interpreted, applied, and enforced. According to the Panel, the differences on this issue do not only "pervade all ranks of the staff, from senior management to front-line professionals," but also apply to "virtually all of the major decisions required by the policies." 
a. Flexibility of Interpretation, Application and Enforcement
One of the issues on which opinions diverge, is the question of whether the Bank's policies allow for flexibility of interpretation, application and enforcement, and if so, to what degree. As Benedict Kingsbury has stated in the context of operational policies on issues affecting indigenous peoples: "Episodes of non-compliance with policies relating to indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement seem often to have been dealt with flexibly by superiors as part of the overall structure of management, with the focus usually on ameliorating project failures and learning for the future. The Operational Directives have thus been understood to be 'binding' on Bank staff within the Bank management structure, but applied and enforced flexibly rather than 'legalistically'". 134 This approach to the implementation of and compliance with Bank policies was adopted most commonly before the Inspection Panel was created. It was, however, widely followed after 1993 as well, as can be seen from the Panel's most recent Investigation Report regarding the Quinghai Project. According to that Report, the views among Bank staff on the extent of the binding force of Bank policies and procedures still range from arguments that "the Bank's Operational Directives and other policies were simply idealized policy statements, and should be seen largely as a set of goals to be striven after" 135 According to proponents of this view, "(w)hat would be more important is the overall trend in the Bank, which should work toward the achievement of these goals. In the meantime, one may have to accept what might appear mandatory effect, to opposing views by more senior ranks that such an interpretation "could render the policies virtually meaningless and certainly incapable of being employed as benchmarks against which to measure compliance."
136
The Inspection Panel raised serious concerns about the implications of such wide divergencies of opinion for Bank Management's ability to apply the policies "with any reasonable degree of consistency." 137 In view of these differences, the Panel deemed it necessary to re-examine its approach towards and experience with Bank policies and compliance. 138 It carefully studied the arguments put forward by Bank Management, staff and consultants in defence of the actions or omissions under review, such as claims of "precedent," a point which will be discussed in more detail later. In the end, the Panel followed the same approach to compliance as in its earlier reports. 139 As regards the flexibility of interpretation in general, the Panel adopted the position taken by Ibrahim Shihata, that there was room for some flexibility of interpretation but that operational directives themselves provided the limits of flexibility with regard to their application, and that "[t]he staff are accountable to management for the observance of the ODs, with such latitude as their text may explicitly indicate".
140
Whereas Shihata's approach to the question of flexibility of interpretation is widely followed by scholars who have written on this subject-matter, 141 the question whether the standards provided for in the ODs are legally binding is still disputed. Making reference to the preambular paragraph of the ODs, Shihata has maintained that "ODs are general instructions from management to staff issued for their guidance". 142 According to Shihata "not all the standards provided for in the ODs are binding (it depends on the wording of each standard), those stated in binding terms create a duty for the staff to exert their best efto be failures in achieving the sometimes high standards embodied in the policies." See ibid. 136 Ibid., 20, para. 35. 137 Ibid., 16, para. 25; 19, para. 34; and Executive Summary, see note 133, xiv, para. 9. 138 Cf. ibid., Executive Summary, see note 133, xv, para. 15. 139 Cf. ibid., xv, para. 15, and The Inspection Panel Investigation Report, see note 8,22, para. 45. 140 Shihata, 1994, see note 51,44. 141 See, e.g., S. Schlemmer-Schulte, see note 97,178.
forts to achieve them. The actual achievement of these standards may depend on the action of other parties, notably the potential borrower or the borrower, as the case may be."
143 Unlike Shihata, SchlemmerSchulte argues, that Bank policies and procedures "are binding on staff and must, therefore, be followed by staff." 144 The Chinese Government, in its statement of 6 July 2000 on the Inspection Panel Investigation Report for the Quinghai Project, criticized the Panel for its approach on the legal effect of safeguard policies. In the view of the Chinese Government, "[t]he safeguard policies have not been written as strict law to be applied mechanistically," 145 as -according to the Chinese Government -the Panel had suggested. The Panel members did not "distinguish between mandatory procedures and best practices," 146 but did nevertheless pretend that there was a clear understanding of what was mandatory.
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The uncertainty about the legally binding effect of Operational Directives is mainly due to the fact that ODs include a mixture of policies, procedures, and guidance which are not always easy to differentiate. 148 However, in order to facilitate the work both of the Bank staff and the Inspection Panel, as well as for the benefit of outside parties, the Bank initiated a process in the early 1990s with the aim of gradually convening ODs into a new system of Operational Policies (OPs) and Bank Procedures (BPs), both mandatory rules, on the one hand, and Good Practices (GPs) -that is guidelines which clarify what is international best practice 149 and which are not necessarily mandatory -on the other hand. This process is expected to result in more certainty.
b. Methods of Interpretation of Bank Policies and Procedures
The Inspection Panel, in reviewing the Bank's project performance by reference to Bank policies and procedures, is confronted with the diffi- by the applicable policies. In other words, the Panel must decide which methods of interpretation to apply in order to work out the exact project requirements spelt out in the policies and procedures. In the Quinghai Project Investigation Report, the Panel stated that " [d] uring the course of examining some 20 projects over the past five years,... [it] has gained much experience in determining how the Bank's operational policies and procedures should be applied." 150 In the following section, the methods most frequently used by the Panel will be analyzed. many of the most significant social and environmental impacts of the Project on the potentially affected populations, including those who are members of minority nationalities. The Panel finds that this is not in compliance with these ODs."
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In the same case, the Panel, in reviewing the Bank's social compliance, determined what was required by OD 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples by adopting both the systematic and the teleological approach of interpretation, to which, in the context of treaty law interpretation reference is usually only made if the textual approach leaves the meaning ambiguous. 155 In the Quinghai case, the central question regarding social compliance was whether the Quinghai Project as a whole constituted the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) required by Operational Directive 4.20 or whether separate, free-standing IPDPs were required to bring the Project into compliance with OD 4.20. The relevant para. 13 of said Directive states that: "[f]or an investment project that affects indigenous peoples, the borrower should prepare an indigenous development plan that is consistent with the Bank's policy. Any project that affects indigenous peoples is expected to include components or provisions that incorporate such a plan. When the bulk of the direct project beneficiaries are indigenous peoples, the Bank's concerns would be addressed by the project itself and the provisions of this OD would thus apply to the project in its entirety."
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The Bank Management, while acknowledging that an IPDP was required for the Quinghai Project, referred to the letter of the last sentence of para. 13 quoted above and asserted that the Project as a whole constituted the necessary IDPD as a majority of the Project's beneficiaries were minorities. 157 The Panel, however, was of the view that, irrespective of the clear wording, Management's interpretation of this one sentence of para. 13 "cannot be accepted."
158 It based its conclusion both on the system and the objective of OD 4.30 and argued that Management's interpretation was "inconsistent with other parts of the OD and especially inconsistent with the objective of Bank policy towards 154 The Inspection Panel, Executive Summary, see note 133, xvii, para. 23. 155 As to the teleological approach in the context of treaty interpretation, see, e.g. Brownlie, see note 152, 631. 156 IBRD/IDA, OD 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples (September 1991), published in: Shihata, see note 3,401 et seq. 157 Cf. The Inspection Panel, Executive Summary, see note 133, xxvi, para. 62. 158 Ibid., para. 63. indigenous people," 159 the latter being "... to ensure that the development process fosters full respect for their dignity, human rights, and cultural uniqueness ..." and to "ensure that indigenous peoples do not suffer adverse effects during the development process ..., and that they receive culturally compatible social and economic benefits." 160 The Panel argued that "as a result of Management's choice not to develop self-standing IPDPs for the different minority groups" which are affected by the Quinghai Project, "the cultural uniqueness and needs of some groups ... seem inadequately to have been addressed."
161 Management's interpretation of the last sentence of para. 13 of OD 4.20 "was never intended and should not be allowed to stand," 162 as the result of such an approach may be "that a Bank-financed project could legitimately overwhelm the hopes and aspirations of an indigenous population, so long as the project benefits a larger population of some other indigenous people. And the 'project in its entirety' could constitute the ... IPDP required by the OD since 'the bulk of the direct project beneficiaries' would be indigenous people." 163 This example illustrates that the Inspection Panel, even in cases in which the meaning of a Bank provision seems to be clear, nevertheless has recourse to the teleological approach trying to determine the true project requirements as set out by the applicable policies and procedures by implementing the objectives of a Bank policy as determined by the Panel.
bb. Experience or Precedent in the Country in Question or Elsewhere
In the Investigation Report on the Quinghai Project, the Panel dealt at length with the question whether past experience or precedent can be seen as evidence that Bank policies and procedures were followed in the case under review. The starting point of this analysis was the question whether the Bank was in compliance with OD 4.01, Environmental Assessment, 164 mental Assessment of January 1999 together, 165 but was nevertheless the standard against which Bank performance regarding the Quinghai project had to be reviewed given that the Bank actions and omissions at issue fell within a period of time prior to the conversion of OD 4.01. Pursuant to OD 4.01, the Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank financing to help ensure "that the project options under consideration are environmentally sound and sustainable."
166 According to the Inspection Panel "
[o]ne of the most important decisions (perhaps the most crucial) that Management must make concerning the environmental assessment of any project is the category of the assessment that will be undertaken," 167 as this determines the appropriate extent and type of EA:
Under OD 4.01, a project can either be classified a Category "A", "B", or "C". 168 The first category regards projects which are "likely to have significant adverse impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible, and diverse. The impacts are likely to be comprehensive, broad, sector-wide, or precedent-setting." 169 In such a case, a full EA is required. 170 A proposed project is classified a Category "B" if it "may have adverse environmental impacts that are less significant than category A impacts." 171 For a Category B project, no full EA, but an environmental analysis is required. 172 For a Category C project, which is unlikely to have adverse impacts, 173 no EA or environmental analysis is required. 174 An Annex to OD 4.01 provides illustrative lists of the types of projects best classified in each category. 175 In the Quinghai case, a Category "B" was assigned to the project although several components of the Project fell within the list of "A"
projects, e.g. dams and reservoirs, irrigation, resettlement and all projects with potentially major impacts on people. 176 The Panel also found that the impacts qualified as "sensitive" since vulnerable ethnic minorities were affected and involuntary resettlement was involved.
177 It concluded that the Environmental Assessment of the Quinghai Project was not in compliance with Bank policies as set out in OD 4.01.
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The interesting point, in the context of policy interpretation, is that the Inspection Panel, in making its recommendation regarding the Quinghai Project, was confronted with both the Management Response and views expressed by Bank staff and consultants that Management's past experience and precedents from other approved projects in China, or from other social and environmental assessments within China, could be cited as sufficient evidence that Bank policies and procedures concerning Environmental Assessment were followed in the case of the Quinghai Project as well. The Bank Management, in defense of the criticised assignment of a Category "B" rather than "A", referred to "... past practice with ... a large number of similar integrated agricultural development projects financed by the Bank in China over the last 10 years." 179 The Panel did, however, reject the view that precedent could determine what is required by Bank policies and procedure. It concluded that: "Management's past experience in a country is obviously important. It can provide the basis for a certain level of comfort that the work that is required by the policies will be undertaken successfully. It is an entirely different matter, however, to suggest that experience and precedent can determine what is required by the policies.
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... The Panel has carefully examined the policies and has failed to find any grounds for the view that precedents in a country... can in any way determine what is required by the policies."
181
The Panel likewise disapproved of a similar argument regarding the significance of precedents for the interpretation and application of policies 176 themselves. 186 Up to now, the Inspection Panel exercised its powers within its formal mandate and has, accordingly, not gone so far as to evaluate the content of the Bank policies and procedures in question or to recommend amendment thereof.
As regards the Panel's interpretation of the applicable Bank rules one may join Bradlow in speculating that " [t] he role of the Panel in interpreting the Bank's operating policies and procedures could increase as the Bank converts its Operational Directives into Operational Policies."
187 As the conversion process has not been concluded yet, it is still too early to determine whether the Panel's practice will confirm this prediction which was made in 1996. The Panel's most recent Investigation Report regarding the Quinghai Project does, in part, support Bradlow's prediction; it does, however, also suggest that guarded optimism may be appropriate. Bradlow's prediction is confirmed by the Panel's approach with regard to the Bank policies on indigenous peoples as described above: The Panel seems to have felt bound to ignore the wording of the policy provision in question, and instead to interpret it according to the apparent objective of the policy on indigenous peoples.
The Panel's approach regarding the interpretation and implementation of Bank Safeguard Policies has been harshly criticized by the Chinese Government. In its statement of 6 July 2000, the Chinese Government alleged that "the Inspection Panel has grossly overstepped its authority by seeking to interpret and establish policy requirements -a matter that falls into the prerogative of the Board." In the view of the Chinese Government, "(t]he Panel sets new and unimplementable standards for safeguard policies," and "gives instructions to the Board and Management as to how poverty reduction projects are prepared and implemented." The Chinese Government's criticism is, however, invalid in light of the Panel's rather cautious approach to determine compliance with policies on involuntary resettlement. In the Quinghai Project investigation, one of the core issues regarding involuntary resettlement was whether the nearly 60.000 migrants from the Move-out area were "voluntary" resettlers, as Bank Management contended, 189 or whether they were "involuntarily" affected. This distinction is crucial as OD 4.30 on involuntary resettlement applies only to involuntary resettlement. 190 The Panel, in determining Bank compliance with OD 4.30, had to decide which requirements had to be fulfilled for a resettlement to be considered "voluntary." The impression which the Panel got from its discussions with people in the Move-out area was that "they felt they had a choice whether they could move or not, and most interviewed wanted to move." 191 The Panel did, however, also find that most people "were not informed ... of the desert climate, poor soils, danger of salinization, and the long start-up time needed before farms would be functioning in the new irrigation areas."
192 For this reason, the Panel called into question whether the resettlers' choice was an "informed" one and whether, therefore, the resettlement could be considered "voluntary. Voluntary'."
194 It did, therefore, accept the Bank Management's view that OD 4.30 did not apply to the migrants from the Move-out area.
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As stated at the outset, the Resolution seems neither to envisage the Panel assessing the adequacy of a Bank policy, nor does it authorise the Panel to enter into policy-making activities, such as the establishment of policy requirements. It does, however, not prevent the Panel from interpreting the policies and procedures, the compliance of which it has to review. The Panel's future challenge will be to, on the one hand, provide for reasoned interpretations of key aspects of the applicable Operational Directives and Policies in their analysis of the Bank performance under investigation without, on the other hand, overstepping its authority by seeking to read policy requirements into the safeguard policies which might be very desirable, but not intended by the Bank's policy makers. By failing to find reasoned interpretations in cases in which the operational policies and procedures do not give clear guidance, the Panel stresses its non-judicial, technical nature instead of enhancing its jurisprudence and its own role. By seeking to establish policy requirements not intended by the policies' authors, however, it clearly oversteps its authority. Given this inconsistency, the Board should review and clarify the Panel's role in the interpretation and implementation of Bank policies and procedures.
V. Consequences of Inspection Panel Investigations and Recommendations: Benefits and Challenges
Roughly half of all complaints filed with the Inspection Panel to date resulted in some favourable outcome not only for the Requesters, but also for other project-affected people, and often the environment, too. In some cases, the Request for Inspection ended in the World Bank or the borrowing country taking some remedial actions, such as the development of action plans, the appointment of independent investigators other than the Panel Inspectors, 196 or the creation of a local monitoring panel. 197 It is important to note that the Requesters did not only receive benefits if the request resulted in the Panel recommending an investigation. In the case regarding a project to build a bridge over the Jamuna River in Bangladesh, for example, Bank Management did not recognize violations and the Inspection Panel refrained from recommending an investigation. The claim, nevertheless, resulted in the development of an action plan to remedy obvious problems in the project: Inter alia, approximately 70. 000 people who were originally excluded from the resettlement plan were included.
198 A second category of Panel proceedings lead to additional financing to address adverse social and environmental impacts of Bank-funded projects in Argentina and Brazil.
199 Finally, two Panel proceedings ended in the Bank cancelling or withdrawing from an offer of funding: The proceeding regarding the controversial Arun III Proposed Hydroelectric Project in Nepal, 200 and the proceeding concerning the aforementioned Quinghai Project.
Wolfensohn did, however, appoint Dr. Jay Hair as independent investigator to examine the situation. Cf. Bank Information Center, The cancellation of the Bank's support for the Arun III Project has been regarded by scholars as a "benefit" which the Requesters received, 201 or even as "an extraordinary success which illustrated both the significance and the necessity of the Panel." 202 There is certainly some truth in this assessment, and the argument may be made that, as Handl has put it in the context of multilateral development banks and their contribution to sustainable development, "a refusal by an MDB to participate in an environmentally questionable project can undeniably carry a potent symbolic message: it may well, and indeed should, discourage other potential lenders, be they private or public entities, from going ahead with an investment project that has been found wanting in light of the environmental and social development criteria that the bank is obliged to follow as a matter of public international law and policy." 203 However, effusive optimism -which, of course, not all academics cited express - 204 should be warned against. The cancellation of a Bank offer gives rise to the question whether withdrawal is really desirable given that the government in charge of the project will complete the project on its own, that is without surveillance from the World Bank, as in the case of the Quinghai Project. In response to China's withdrawal of its loan application, Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, regarded the termination of World Bank financing as a "pyrrhic" victory won by pro-Tibet protesters, because China would now go ahead with the project with its own cash under its own terms. Short put forward, however, that they regretted that the project "will no longer be taken forward with the support of World Bank [which] would have ensured that high social and environmental stan-dards were adhered to."
205 Bufi questions, with regard to this problem, whether the Bank should be content with lower standards in such sensitive areas as environment, involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, protection of cultural heritage, etc., when there is a clear risk that if the Bank withdraws, the project in question will be sponsored by private investors who do not, or do only to a much lesser extent, adhere to the Bank's principles as enshrined in its safeguard policies. 206 The question points to a fundamental dilemma with which the World Bank is confronted in cases like this. On the one hand, the Bank's discretion is restricted by the environmental and social development criteria that it is obliged to follow as a matter of public international law and policy. 207 These international law standards restrain the Bank from funding projects that are in flagrant violation of the project requirements set out in the Bank's policies and procedures in so far as they, themselves, reflect international law standards. On the other hand, the Bank, if it continued to finance projects that are -in some respect -inconsistent with established Bank policies, could at least exercise some control over the projects to prevent them from being executed with little or no regard to safeguard policies. In light of the current criticism that the Bank's strict social and environmental requirements not only make its projects more complicated, but also more costly -leading to a loss of the Bank's competitive position 208 -it will be interesting to see how the Bank will find a solution to the dilemma described above.
assuming that such a possibility exists in law -212 will most likely be in vain: states generally refrain from bringing complaints of human rights violations by another state under any international procedure. 213 These circumstances have not changed with the creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel. With the establishment of the Panel, the World Bank has set an important precedent for offering non-state actors the possibility of triggering a compliance monitoring mechanism which may, in the end, result in the correction of failures resulting from non-compliance with its own environmental and social project requirements. The Panel does not, however, represent "a legal remedy mechanism through which positions described in the Bank's policies or rights referred to in the Resolution could be enforced against the Bank." 214 The Resolution grants individuals standing before an independent investigatory body or accountability mechanism. It does not accord them the remedy of a legal action in a court. 215 The creation of the Panel was the World Bank's response to a growing international movement demanding greater transparency, accountability, and citizen participation at international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization, which are accused of making decisions that affect the lives of people all over the world, in particular the lives and livelihoods of the poor and defenceless, without a clear system for accountability and demo- Bank violates international law when human rights abuses take place in its projects, and that member states share responsibility for those abuses; (2) a suit against members of the World Bank which have become parties to international human rights covenants with compromissory clauses granting jurisdiction to the Court, making the same claim as in (1); and (3) a plea to members of the World Bank to pressure the Bank into requesting an advisory opinion of the Court on whether the Bank and its members violate international law when human rights abuses occur in its projects." Ibid., 488. 213 Shelton, see note 209. 214 Schlemmer-Schulte, see note 5. 215 Cf.ibid. cratic participation. 216 The Inspection Panel demonstrates the World Bank's willingness to increase its accountability and transparency. According to the Panel members themselves, the mere existence of the Panel has already enhanced Bank staff awareness that they are accountable for the Bank's compliance with its own policies and procedures. 217 Currently, the Panel's authority encompasses only the operations of the IBRD and the IDA. Private sector projects by the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are not subject to Panel review. 218 Various non-governmental organisations including Friends of the Earth, a US-based NGO, as well as some scholars are demanding that the Panel's authority expand to encompass the operations of the entire World Bank. 219 An alternative suggestion is for a separate, independent review panel for the IFC/MIGA to be established. 220 Either solution seems to be not only desirable but also necessary in order to extend the concept of accountability of international financial institutions to the public. 221 The creation of the World Bank's Inspection Panel could, inter alia, be seen as a serious attempt by the World Bank to create a convincing solution to a fundamental dilemma that development finance institutions which provide funding and advice for development projects are faced with -a dilemma that has traditionally been considered to be irreconcilable. The dilemma is caused by two seemingly conflicting mandates -to help developing countries allocate and use their resources to maximise public welfare, and to ensure that the majority does not advance at the expense of a minority group or the environment. The underlying problem has been poignantly summarised by Bradlow: "[A]ll development projects, whether they be the building of new dams, highways, power systems, or sports stadiums, involve conflict between those who believe that legitimately chosen policy makers have the right to except that their decisions regarding development will be respected and those who believe that development projects imposing an unfair burden on any specific group of people are unacceptable. This dispute often also becomes a dispute between national policy makers, who believe that sovereignty should protect their decisions from outside interference, and those who believe that certain internationally recognized standards of good practice are universally applicable. This latter group also contends that project decision makers who fall below these standards in their decisions and actions should be held internationally accountable."
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Although the Inspection Panel, thus far, has not specifically invoked international law standards other than Bank policies and procedures, as would be desirable, the Panel is an important means of holding an international finance organisation directly accountable for compliance with its own policies, and for the adverse effects that their decisions and actions may have on the environment and the people who live in the project areas.
